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Abstract 
This article outlines the European Union’s gradual progression 
towards a legal obligation to observe human rights: a series of stops 
and starts from Brussels to Strasbourg with a starring role for 
Luxembourg and significant supporting roles for Berlin and 
Karlsruhe. This commitment towards human rights will acquire a 
new dimension. The Lisbon Treaty requires the European Union to 
accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). With 
the entry into force of the 14th Protocol to the ECHR, Strasbourg 
too is now ready to accept the EU as a party to the Convention. But 
the real work is ongoing: the negotiations about the modalities of 
the accession are underway. This article looks at the main subjects 
for discussion. Is the EU, as a new party to the ECHR, the ultimate 
anniversary gift for Strasbourg, or is it a potentially troublesome 
guest at the party? 
  
I. Background: the EU’s Gradual Progression towards a Legal Obligation to 
Observe Human Rights 
The debate about the desirability of the European Union (or its precursors) 
being legally bound to respect human rights has been ongoing for decades.1 It is 
not very strange that in 1957, when the European Economic Community was 
founded, human rights were not at the forefront of people’s minds. Previous 
initiatives to establish a more general European Political Community had died a 
quiet death in 1954, when France’s National Assembly decided not to pursue 
this avenue. Once these initiatives had collapsed, the negotiations focused 
purely on economic cooperation. This is clearly reflected in Article 2 of the EC 
Treaty, which states that the Community’s objective is to promote throughout 
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, a high degree of 
convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness, and 
so forth. None of these objectives leads directly to think of the need to 
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safeguard human rights standards. This was also reflected in the early case law 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)− the Stork, Geitling and Sgarlata cases 
for instance, in which the Court refused to consider the application of human 
rights standards, since they were not explicitly based on any article of the 
Treaty.2 
With the passage of time, however, came a growing awareness that even in the 
case of ever closer economic cooperation, human rights standards might come 
under pressure. Especially Member States with a constitutional tradition, such 
as Germany, found it intolerable that such a powerful organisation was not 
formally obliged to operate within certain policy limits. Therefore some 
national courts reserved the right to declare Community law inapplicable if they 
deemed it incompatible with domestic constitutional provisions.3 Partly out of 
fear that such rulings might undermine the supremacy of Community law,4 the 
Court of Justice of the European Community started to emphasise the 
obligation to observe human rights in its own rulings.5 Finally, in the Nold II 
judgment, the Court held: “As the Court has already stated, fundamental rights 
form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which it 
ensures.”6 Since the European Communities did not have their own catalogue 
of human rights, the Court of Justice was compelled to seek inspiration 
elsewhere. In determining the scope of these fundamental rights, it looked to 
“the constitutional traditions common to the Member States” and to 
“international treaties for the protection of human rights, on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories”.7 The latter 
referred most notably to the ECHR. This case law was later enshrined in EU law, 
in the Maastricht Treaty concluded in 1992.8 Article F (later article 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union) states that the Union “shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms *…+.”However that was not the end of the 
matter; in the following phase, it was once again Germany that took the 
initiative. 
By this time the European Union had been founded in Maastricht based on the 
European Communities, but with the addition of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and close cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs 
(JHA). European cooperation extending into JHA territory would be far likelier 
to raise human rights dilemmas (in cases involving criminal or aliens law, for 
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instance). In Germany, in particular, there was a persistent sense of unease that 
an organisation as powerful as the European Union did not have its own 
binding catalogue of human rights. As a result in 1999, the German EU 
Presidency put an item on the agenda for the Cologne European Council that 
had not attracted much attention beforehand: that the EU should have its own 
written catalogue of human rights. 
For outsiders, the decision to work on a separate catalogue of human rights 
came as a surprise. There was also a certain level of scepticism concerning the 
time it would take for an actual text to materialise (recalling the interminable 
years of negotiations it had taken to draft the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights). However all this underestimated Germany’s determination. A 
convention chaired by former German President Roman Herzog drew up the 
text in twelve months and on the 7th of December 2000, at the European 
Council in Nice, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed.9 
Such speed came at a price: not everyone was convinced that the Charter 
should be legally binding. It was objected that the definition of certain rights 
was too general; that there was only one general limitation clause; that certain 
rights were worded differently, for some inexplicable reason, from similar 
rights in the ECHR and other human rights instruments. For the time being, the 
Charter was not legally binding, but many knew it was only a matter of time 
before its status changed. The Charter existed, and the Court of Justice started 
unobtrusively citing it.10 And in due course, the Lisbon Treaty invested the 
Charter with this legally binding status. On 1 December 2009, the Charter 
acquired the same legal status as the Treaties. 
Thus we have gone from a position of steering clear of human rights in the 
1950s, to a home-grown catalogue of human rights, in 2000. In the meantime, 
this progression towards being legally bound to observe human rights was 
further reinforced by the activities of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
from March 2007 and onwards (FRA).11 This Agency’s objective is to provide the 
relevant institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community and its 
Member States when implementing Community law with assistance and 
expertise relating to fundamental rights in order to support them when they 
take measures or formulate courses of action within their respective spheres of 
competence to fully respect fundamental rights (article 2, Regulation (EC) no. 
168/2007). 
Now the EU had its own written catalogue of fundamental rights and its own 
internal watchdog. Moreover the Lisbon Treaty did not overlook the need for 
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external scrutiny; as it stated that the EU should accede to the ECHR, so that 
the European Court of Human Rights could serve as an external touchstone. 
II. The EU’s Accession to the ECHR 
The idea that the EU should accede to the ECHR is certainly not new.12 It was 
first proposed by the Commission in 1979.13 In 1990 the Commission repeated 
its proposal, in a Communication to the Council.14 On 30 November 1994, the 
Council – consisting in this case of the justice ministers – decided to seek the 
advice of the Court of Justice. The result was Opinion 2/94,15 in which the ECJ 
advised against accession. Or rather, the Court observed that accession was 
impossible in the light of Community law as it existed at the time, since there 
was no firm legal basis for it. Malicious tongues said that the Opinion was the 
result of covert rivalry between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts. This 
cannot be inferred from the wording of the Opinion, which merely states that 
accession to the ECHR would mean “a substantial change in the present 
Community system for the protection of human rights in that it would entail 
the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional system as 
well as integration of all the provisions of the Convention into the Community 
legal order”. The political will to deal with the legal problems that accession 
would entail was evidently still lacking. 
This did not mean that the issue disappeared from the agenda altogether. 
Those in favour of accession continued to point out the ways in which accession 
would enhance the coherence of the system of legal protection in the European 
region. However, two concerns in particular had to be addressed: (a) that the 
EU’s accession would subject EU Member States to supplementary obligations 
under the ECHR; and (b) the notion that accession to the ECHR had become 
unnecessary after the proclamation of the Charter as the EU’s own catalogue of 
fundamental rights. Some of these points are briefly discussed below. 
Firstly, accession would significantly improve the legal protection of EU citizens. 
As things stood, it was impossible to complain about alleged human rights 
violations by the EU institutions themselves. In relation to human rights 
violations resulting from a government’s actions in its implementation of 
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Community law, the Strasbourg Court had adopted a fine-tuned position in the 
Bosphorus case: ruling that a Member State could in principle presume that it is 
not breaching the ECHR by fulfilling its international obligations, provided the 
international organisation itself ensured adequate protection of human rights 
(as was accepted in relation to the EU). In exceptional cases, where the 
protection was manifestly insufficient, this presumption could be rebutted.16 
The EU’s accession to the ECHR would thus expand the legal protection 
afforded by Strasbourg in two ways: (a) by making it possible to complain about 
alleged human rights violations by EU institutions themselves; and (b) by 
making it possible to complain about alleged human rights violations 
committed by Member States in their implementation of Community law 
(without having to take account of the Bosphorus ruling). 
Secondly, accession would minimise the risk of the two courts arriving at 
diverging interpretations of human rights standards. Such divergences were 
already occurring,17 but their frequency might well increase if the ECJ were to 
take less account of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case law 
(since the EU had its own human rights instrument and no longer had to consult 
the ECHR as a source of inspiration). After accession, the Strasbourg Court 
would have the final word on the interpretation of rights enshrined in the 
ECHR. 
Lastly, the existence of an external touchstone may be deemed desirable in 
itself. As was shown in the previous section, human rights today greatly enjoy 
improved institutional safeguards within the legal order of the EU. Nonetheless, 
the possibility of external scrutiny may be a good thing. Take the following 
example; for many years in the Netherlands we thought it was perfectly 
reasonable that the power to order someone’s committal to a psychiatric 
institution was vested in the local mayor. That was the system we were used to, 
and to us it seemed perfectly normal. Until the ECHR looked at Dutch practice 
from a greater distance, and pointed out that it was actually very odd that the 
hospitalisation of psychiatric patients was not ordered by the courts after 
medical advice had been sought.18 Today, this change is embedded in our legal 
culture, and it strikes us as strange that we ever had a system that did not 
assign a key role to the courts in the case of such a far-reaching intervention in 
someone’s private life. It is useful to have a critical mirror in which to view 
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one’s own legal order from a greater distance. The same applies to the EU once 
it becomes a party to the Convention. The EU’s accession to the ECHR should 
not be seen as a form of interference in EU law, but as supplemental to that 
legal system. What is more, the EU’s accession to the ECHR will send a strong 
signal to third countries (such as China and Iran) that are frequently called to 
account by the EU in relation to human rights issues. By acceding to the ECHR, 
the EU will demonstrate that it too is willing to submit to external scrutiny. 
In the debate about the EU’s accession to the ECHR, two other matters are 
raised which supposedly militate against it. The first is the fact that the EU now 
has its own Charter of Fundamental Rights. If the implication is that the 
Charter’s adoption has rendered accession to the ECHR redundant, this can be 
refuted by the points outlined above. In my view, the presence of a sound 
internal infrastructure to safeguard human rights does not detract from the 
desirability of external scrutiny. In the case of national States that are party to 
the ECHR, no one would question the need for the country to have its own 
Constitution, its own system to protect human rights, and national judicial 
oversight of compliance with human rights standards. Indeed, the protection of 
the rights enshrined in the ECHR should be effected primarily within the 
internal legal order. This applies to national legal orders, and it applies equally 
to that of the Community. The protection of human rights should primarily be a 
matter for the EU’s own institutions (including the ECJ) on the basis of the 
Charter. But that does not mean that subsidiary external oversight by the ECHR 
could be considered redundant. The second objection is a fear expressed by 
some policymakers that the EU’s accession to the ECHR will create additional 
obligations for Member States under the Convention. In my view, this fear is 
largely unjustified. The EU’s institutions will be bound by the ECHR, but this 
does not influence the degree to which the Netherlands, say, is bound by the 
Convention. It may perhaps become less easy for EU Member States to invoke 
the Bosphorus case law in the implementation of EU law. On the other hand, 
applications could in future be directed against the European Union itself, 
largely superseding the somewhat artificial responsibility of Member States 
under the ECHR.  
At this point, some readers may be wondering why I am dwelling at such length 
on the arguments for and against the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Isn’t 
accession already a done deal? Certainly. Even so, the matter still provokes 
fierce debate.19 So it seems a good idea to continue emphasising why the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR is a good thing. At the same time, it would appear 
sensible to point out that the EU’s accession to the ECHR is now a political and 
legal reality. The ECJ shelved the idea in its Opinion 2/94, only to see it 
resurface in 2002. In fact it was the President of the ECJ himself who raised the 
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matter. At the opening of the judicial year of the ECHR on 31 January 2002, 
President M. Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias observed: 
Although the Court of Justice has always avoided adopting a 
position on the desirability of acceding to the Convention – rightly, 
in my view –, some of its members, including myself, have 
expressed themselves personally to be in favour of such accession, 
which would reinforce the uniformity of the system for the 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe.20 
The European leaders subsequently decided to place the issue on the agenda of 
the Convention that had been established to make preparations for further 
institutional reforms of the EU after the Nice Treaty. The Draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, which the Praesidium of this Convention 
proposed in June 2003, included the possibility of accession to the ECHR in 
Article I-7 §2: “The Union shall seek accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights”.21 As everyone knows, the Constitutional Treaty came to a sticky 
end, but the provision on accession was retained in the subsequent talks. 
Accession was incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty without any proviso: “The 
Union shall accede . . .” (Article 6, para 2, Treaty on European Union).22 
The wording that was eventually adopted seems to imply that accession is a 
matter decided wholly by the EU itself. That is obviously not the case. The 
Council of Europe, with its 47 Member States, also had to approve. The Council 
of Europe has therefore done some preliminary work of its own. Protocol 14, 
which was recently ratified by all Member States, includes an article that 
provides for the possibility of accession: “The European Union may accede to 
the Convention”. The Explanatory Report on this article indicates clearly that 
the matter is far from settled, and that the negotiations on the modalities of 
accession have yet to take place: 
It should be emphasised that further modifications to the 
Convention will be necessary in order to make such accession 
possible from a legal and technical point of view. . . . At the time of 
drafting of this protocol, it was not yet possible to enter into 
negotiations − and even less to conclude an agreement − with the 
European Union on the terms of the latter’s possible accession to 
the Convention, simply because the European Union still lacked the 
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competence to do so. . . . As a consequence, a second ratification 
procedure will be necessary in respect of those further 
modifications, whether they will be included in a new amending 
protocol or in an accession treaty.23 
All those who still have vivid memories of the gruelling ratification process of 
Protocol 14 are already looking forward to this second round. It is a fact that 
the Lisbon Treaty and the entry into force of the 14th Protocol to the ECHR 
cleared the way for the actual negotiations between the European Union and 
the Council of Europe on the modalities of accession to begin. This however 
raised the question of who should conduct the negotiations on behalf of each 
of the two parties. 
III. Organisation of the Negotiations 
In the EU, negotiations are conducted on behalf of the European Commission. 
There was initially some talk of assigning a role to the High Representative, 
because of the possible implications of accession for CFSP issues or for the 
Presidency, but fairly soon it became clear that the Commission alone 
negotiates on behalf of the EU. 
It was more difficult for the Council of Europe to designate a partner in the 
negotiations. The Secretariat of a purely inter-governmental organisation such 
as the Council of Europe is not comparable to the Commission. The Committee 
of Ministers is the highest organ in the Council of Europe (Article 13 of the 
Statute of the Council of Europe), but the Committee of Ministers leaves the 
preparatory work to a range of steering committees. In the sphere of human 
rights, this is the Steering Committee for Human Rights (Comité Directeur Droits 
de l’Homme, CDDH). Back in 2002, a CDDH working group drafted a report on 
the technical issues that should be dealt with in relation to the accession of the 
EU – not being a State – to the Convention.24 So it seemed reasonable to 
involve this Steering Committee in the actual negotiations. Eventually it was 
decided to assign the negotiations to a working group formed from within the 
CDDH. Assembling this working group (CDDH-EU) proved tricky. On the one 
hand, it was felt that the working group should not be too large, but on the 
other hand, it had to proportionally represent EU States and non-EU Member 
States (EU Member States being particularly eager to take part). The working 
group that eventually materialised has 14 members, each of whom participates 
in a personal capacity. Half are from EU Member States: the Netherlands, 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Finland, Latvia and Romania. The other 
half are from Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Norway, Russia, Switzerland and 
Turkey. In its early meetings the working group drew up a list of subjects for 
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discussion25 and exchanged views on elements of an accession instrument.26 
Some of these subjects are looked at in section 4 below. 
As a result, the negotiations have become largely bipolar in nature; 
nonetheless, the results of the negotiations must obviously be presented to 
both organisations for approval at a later stage. This means that within the 
Council of Europe, the final decision must be taken by the Committee of 
Ministers. 
IV. Subjects for Discussion 
A number of relevant topics are examined below. In my personal opinion, it is 
perfectly clear that certain parameters are to be observed in these 
negotiations:  
- accession should not create any new powers for the EU, and accession 
should not alter the existing obligations of Member States under the 
ECHR; 
- accession should leave the existing ECHR monitoring mechanism intact 
as far as  possible, and the EU should be treated as far as possible in the 
same way as any other  party to the Convention; 
- accession should not affect the competences of the Union or the powers 
of its  institutions (see Article 2 of Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty); 
- accession should be finalised as soon as possible, which implies a 
minimalist accession instrument that regulates only the most essential 
matters. Matters relating only to the EU Member States or to the EU’s 
internal procedures should in principle be arranged by means of the 
EU’s internal legal instruments (such as a Council Regulation or 
Decision). In this connection, the EU will want to – and should – ensure 
that accession does not lead to Treaty amendments (e.g. in relation to 
the Court of Justice’s involvement in Strasbourg proceedings). 
The following sections examine a number of specific issues that will certainly 
need to be settled in the negotiations. 
IV.1 Role of the Court of Justice and the Devising of a Co-respondent 
Mechanism (CRM) 
The first of these issues, namely the importance of the – prior – involvement of 
the ECJ, before a case against the EU can be brought before the Strasbourg 
Court, serves a range of interests. The rights enshrined in the ECHR must be 
safeguarded in the first instance at the level of the specific High Contracting 
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Party.27 The Strasbourg mechanism is a subsidiary mechanism that can serve as 
a safety net after all effective domestic remedies have been exhausted. Indeed, 
it could not be otherwise. Strasbourg has no mandate to act as Europe’s 
primary constitutional court. Nor does it possess either the human resources or 
the budget to perform such a task. For this reason alone, it would be preferable 
for the ECJ to be assigned a primary role in safeguarding the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the ECHR. At the same time, the EU will surely want the 
ECJ to be able to consider a specific problem before it is brought before the 
Strasbourg Court. After all, the EU will wish to maintain, as much as possible, 
the principle that only the ECJ can declare EU legislation to be incompatible 
with human rights standards. At the same time, it must be said that at this 
level, the EU cannot be compared to a national State as a High Contracting 
Party. After all, not all applicants will necessarily have had access to the ECJ,28 
either because the natural or legal person concerned could have no direct 
recourse to the ECJ or because the national court wrongly omitted to seek a 
preliminary ruling from the Luxembourg courts. At the same time, one must 
take account of the interest that potential applicants have in avoiding 
unreasonably long throughput times because of an accumulation of 
proceedings in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, which would undermine the 
effective legal protection that one is seeking to provide.  
The second issue is that of devising a co-respondent mechanism (CRM). This 
mechanism would seek to ensure that the EU is identified as a respondent if an 
applicant erroneously addresses his application under the ECHR only to the 
Member State and not simultaneously to the EU. It may be noted that the 
reverse situation, too, may occur. Then the co-respondent mechanism will 
prevent the EU or EU Member State, respectively, from being dependent on 
the Strasbourg Court for admission as an intervening party. What is more, a 
respondent party and an intervening party do not have identical rights. 
In the light of the above-mentioned issues, Chris Timmermans, at the time a 
Dutch judge at the ECJ,29 voiced his concerns about the guarantees of the ECJ’s 
involvement. He argued that if a case were to be brought against the EU in 
Strasbourg without the ECJ having first had an opportunity to rule, the 
proceedings should be stayed, to allow the case to be referred first to the ECJ. 
In my view, however, Timmermans’s concerns can be allayed by introducing a 
CRM. There would then be nothing to prevent the Commission, as the EU’s 
representative in the ECtHR proceedings, from being instructed to act with the 
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 E.g. in a lecture entitled ‘The Court of Justice of the EU, a Human Rights Court?’, given on 6 
May 2010 at King’s College, London. See also the Court of Justice’s discussion document on 
certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/ 
pdf/2010-05/convention_en_2010-05-21_12-10-16_272.pdf.) 
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(full) involvement of the ECJ − for instance by giving the ECJ an opportunity to 
present an interpretation of EU law that could then be submitted in its entirety 
by the Commission on the EU’s behalf in the ECtHR proceedings. After all, every 
party to the Convention is free to decide how to draft its observations or other 
documents in the proceedings. In principle, this does mean that the ECJ’s 
involvement must be arranged within the time limits applicable to the ECtHR 
proceedings (including the possibility of extension). This would make it 
unnecessary to stay the proceedings in Strasbourg, which would require a 
substantial amendment of the ECHR and EU legislation and call for a 
significantly different approach to the EU, in comparison to other parties to the 
Convention. If the ECJ holds that the actions that have prompted an application 
to Strasbourg are unlawful under EU law, it would be possible to explore the 
scope for resolving the dispute before the ECHR by means of a friendly 
settlement. If this can be done, the case could be removed from the case list on 
the basis of Article 39 (or 37) of the ECHR. If the Court of Justice rules that the 
actions concerned are lawful under EU law, it would then be up to the 
Strasbourg Court to rule on whether these actions were compatible with the 
Convention. 
There is one practical complication I wish to raise in this connection. To make 
effective use of the CRM, the Commission (and if the above model is followed, 
the Court of Justice) must be able to take cognizance of cases that are pending 
in Strasbourg. Still, it would seem to me to be wise to allow the registry of the 
Strasbourg Court a certain responsibility for selecting relevant cases. Are we 
going to present all the cases that are pending in Strasbourg against an EU 
Member State to the Commission, so that it can decide whether to invoke the 
CRM? This would seem to me a completely unworkable modus operandi, unless 
it were decided to install a ‘shadow registry’ in Brussels. The disadvantages of 
such a step – the added pressure on human resources and the duplication of 
work – would appear obvious. I would trust the registry in Strasbourg to make 
an initial prudent selection. In any case, it could be agreed that only 
applications that are not brought before a single judge as being manifestly ill-
founded or inadmissible on other grounds would be submitted to the 
Commission. 
IV.2 Representation of the European Union in the ECHR’s Supervisory 
Mechanism 
The EU is acceding to the ECHR; it is not becoming a member of the Council of 
Europe. Even so, the EU’s decision to be bound by the ECHR’s supervisory 
mechanism (which embraces more than merely the Court) makes it necessary 
to think about the EU’s participation in various organs of the Council of Europe. 
Three types of participation should be considered: a judge in the Court, 
representation in the Committee of Ministers (in relation to the execution of 
judgments) and representation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (in relation to the election of judges). If we treat the EU, as far as 
possible, as an ‘ordinary’ party to the Convention, it seems obvious to me that 
the EU should participate in these three organs on the same basis as other 
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parties to the Convention, at least inasmuch as their activities bear on the 
Court’s judicial tasks. 
First and foremost, I believe that this means that the EU should have a 
permanent judge on the Strasbourg Court. To me, the appointment of an ad 
hoc judge who only sits in cases against the EU seems wrong in principle and 
unworkable in practice. Wrong in principle, because no such restriction applies 
to other parties to the Convention: the Dutch judge, Egbert Myjer, is not 
confined to ruling in cases against the Netherlands. Unworkable in practice, 
because precisely in cases against the EU, the question will frequently arise, as 
to whether the EU or a State should be the respondent (see above). This 
question will have to be answered as early as possible in the proceedings. It 
would therefore seem prudent to be able to call on a judge who has been 
chosen in part for his expertise in the sphere of EU law (just as national judges 
are selected partly for their ability to explain the finer points of their national 
law to their fellow judges in chambers). Finally, an extra permanent judge 
would seem to me a welcome source of relief for the overstretched Court. 
In the second place, it seems to me that the EU should also be involved in the 
Committee of Ministers, where the latter supervises the implementation and 
execution of the Court’s judgments. I believe that participation in this 
supervisory role should be welcomed. The EU’s economic power could help to 
improve compliance with judgments.30 The Council of Europe does not have an 
equivalent to the threat of economic and other sanctions available to the 
European Union, both against EU Member States (infringement proceedings 
instituted by the EU) and against members of the Council of Europe that do not 
belong to the EU (accession negotiations of candidate countries or sanctions in 
trade relations). In view of the crucial role of the CDDH, described above, one 
might say that it also makes sense for the EU to participate in the negotiations 
of this Steering Committee. 
In the third place, the EU could be involved in the work of the Parliamentary 
Assembly (PACE), where it is carrying out the specific task under the ECHR of 
appointing judges. An obvious solution would be to achieve the EU’s 
representation in this body by offering seats in PACE to a set number of 
members of the European Parliament (MEP). This would raise the question of 
whether these MEPs should be allowed to vote on all judges or only on the ‘EU 
judge’. Here too, in my view, it is best to adhere to the usual practice: parties to 
the Convention have an interest in ensuring the quality of all the judges elected 
to serve on the Court, not only that of their ‘own’ judges. 
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 Viviane Reding, speaking at the Interlaken Conference held on 18 and 19 February 2010, in 
Proceedings High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Council of Europe 2010, pp. 24-25: ‘I will use all the tools available under the Treaty to ensure 
compliance with the Charter of national legislation that transposes EU law. I will apply a “Zero 
Tolerance Policy” on violations of the Charter. I will certainly not shy away from starting 
infringement proceedings whenever necessary’. It is a pity, however, that Ms Reding confined 
herself here to violations of the Charter, especially since she was speaking at a conference 
about the European Court of Human Rights.  
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IV.3 Accession to ECHR Protocols 
Public debate always refers to the EU’s accession to ‘the ECHR’, but what about 
the Protocols to the ECHR, which include a wealth of additional substantive 
provisions? In view of the EU’s competences, and given the human rights 
problems caused in the past by the EU’s actions, it would make sense to include 
the Protocols in the EU’s accession. This would mean, for instance, that the EU 
would agree to be bound by the right to protection of property and the right to 
free elections by secret ballot, as enshrined in the First Protocol. In view of the 
far-reaching protection of equal treatment guaranteed by the Twelfth Protocol, 
it seems to me equally obvious that the EU would wish to be bound by its 
general prohibition of discrimination. If one were to opt for such a content-
based approach to deciding whether being bound by a specific Protocol would 
have any added value in relation to the EU’s actions, one could go further. 
Certainly in the light of the ongoing initiatives being developed in criminal law 
and aliens law, one could make a case for accession to Protocols such as the 
Fourth (including freedom of movement, but also the prohibition of the 
collective expulsion of aliens), the Seventh (including the right not to be tried or 
punished twice) and the Thirteenth (abolition of the death penalty). However, it 
is very doubtful whether EU Member States that are not bound by a particular 
Protocol would want the EU to be so bound. In that connection, one should 
note the significance of Article 216, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“Agreements concluded by the Union are 
binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.”). As 
things stand, only the First and Sixth Protocols have been ratified by all EU 
Member States. So it cannot be ruled out, however unsatisfactory this may be, 
that the EU will sign up only to these two Protocols in the short term. 
IV.4 Excluding Certain Parts of EU law? 
Another question that may arise is whether the EU’s accession to the ECHR 
should cover areas of EU policy that do not come under the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ. This includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in relation to 
which the Court of Justice possesses no jurisdiction, with the exception of 
certain specific elements.31 Every party to the Convention is obviously free to 
make reservations when acceding to the Convention (see also Article 57 ECHR). 
But reservations ‘of a general character’ are not permitted under this Article. So 
the categorical exclusion of an entire area of policy would seem incompatible 
with the ECHR in its current form, and here too I would favour the European 
Union being treated, as much as possible, as an ‘ordinary’ party to the 
Convention. Where the CFSP is concerned, it should be borne in mind that the 
Strasbourg Court already considers itself competent, on the basis of its existing 
case law, to rule on the external actions taken by Member States on the basis 
of the CFSP. More importantly still in my view, the EU would be setting an 
extremely ill-advised precedent if it were to declare some of its own actions to 
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 Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice has had jurisdiction over 
sanctions taken under the CFSP against natural and legal persons.  
30 FALL ISSUE  2011 
 
 
be beyond the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. This would 
open the door for other parties that would also like at times to deny the 
jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court in relation to actions that they describe as 
politically sensitive. Suppose Russia were to propose excluding the Court from 
involvement in the Chechnya cases?32 
IV.5 Can an EU Member State Submit an Application Against the EU? 
Article 33 ECHR regulates the right of complaint in inter-state cases: “Any High 
Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.” 
The provision is seldom invoked in the Court’s everyday practice, but it is not 
impossible that an EU Member State could submit an application to the Court 
on the basis of this Article against another EU Member State, or against the EU 
as soon as the latter has become a full party to the Convention. Is there a need 
for the workings of this provision to be modified somewhat, partly in the light 
of Article 344 of the TFEU (“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of 
settlement other than those provided for therein.”)? Personally, I am not 
convinced of this. Article 344 does not assign exclusive competence with regard 
to the settlement of disputes to the Court of Justice. Would the treaties not 
provide for the settlement of disputes by the European Court of Human Rights 
once the EU has actually acceded to the ECHR? In my view, the European Union 
should be treated as much as possible as any other party to the Convention. 
Should the European Union wish to demand ‘party discipline’ from the Member 
States, an accession instrument would not be the appropriate place to regulate 
this. It could nonetheless be regulated it in an internal EU document, if there is 
a desire to do so. 
The result 
Should Strasbourg be pleased with the prospect of the EU’s accession as a new 
High Contracting Party? 
On the one hand, accession is the ultimate ‘recognition’ of the authority of the 
ECHR in the sphere of human rights. And that does seem to be an important 
matter in Strasbourg, which sometimes falls prey – undoubtedly, in part as a 
result of the difference in the available budget33 − to an underdog complex. 
Instead of focusing on its own reputation and the expertise it has built up, 
which would be difficult, if not impossible, to equal in the medium term, 
Strasbourg sometimes feels that it is embroiled in an arduous competitive 
struggle. This feeling persists even though numerous indications have been 
given that the Council of Europe remains the yardstick for human rights. The 
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 See the more detailed discussion in N. Jagers, ‘Is er nog plaats voor Rusland in de Raad van 
Europa?’, in NJCM-Bulletin 2007, pp. 1107-1129.  
33
 See my earlier observations on the Council of Europe’s budget in ‘Het Europees Hof voor de 
Rechten van de Mens: luctor et emergo?’, in Ars Aequi 2008, pp. 424-434.  
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Juncker Report,34 published in March 2006, for instance, saw the Council of 
Europe as having a distinct pioneering role. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the Council of Europe and the EU that was 
concluded in 2007 also stresses the Council of Europe’s primacy in the realm of 
human rights: “The Council of Europe will remain the benchmark for human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy in Europe”.35 And this was confirmed 
once again by Commissioner Reding at the 2010 Interlaken Conference on the 
future of the European Court of Human Rights: “*the European Union’s 
accession to the ECHR] will make Strasbourg even more so than it is today the 
European capital of fundamental rights protection”.36 The European Union’s 
accession to the Strasbourg system makes these words a reality. From this 
point of view, accession is the best gift for the ECHR’s 60th anniversary. 
On the other hand, accession will undoubtedly have consequences for the 
Court’s already heavy workload. It is difficult to estimate what the exact 
quantitative consequences will be, partly because the issues mentioned above 
have yet to be resolved. But it seems logical to assume, in any event, that in the 
case of the EU, the Strasbourg Court will serve only as a subsidiary safety net. 
What is more, at the moment, the majority of questions of law in the 
Community’s legal order are not concerned with human rights issues. Some 
therefore express the hope that the EU’s accession will not lead to a substantial 
increase in the workload.37 Personally, I believe that it is possible that in ten 
years’ time we shall be forced to conclude that this initial expectation was 
naïve. The ECHR is also a ‘subsidiary’ safety net in relation to the highest 
domestic courts, but it has been substantial nonetheless. Furthermore the EU is 
becoming more and more active in policy areas which do traditionally involve 
numerous human rights issues. Take criminal law cooperation in the (former) 
third pillar, for instance, or the EU’s involvement in the organisation of asylum 
procedures in the Member States. Accession may be the ECHR’s best 60th 
anniversary gift, but it is still one that will create a lot of work. 
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 In May 2005 Luxembourg’s prime minister Juncker was asked to prepare a report (acting in a 
personal capacity) on the relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe (partly in view 
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Even so, I believe that the final verdict on the gift can only be positive. And in 
that connection, I should like to mention two welcome side-effects of 
accession. The first is financial. If the EU is one of the parties using the Court’s 
services, and if it shares responsibility for the Court’s workload, it is only 
reasonable that the EU should also contribute to the Court’s budget. Strictly 
speaking, I should refer here not just to the Court itself, but to all Council of 
Europe activities that are linked to the supervisory mechanism under the ECHR 
– including the tasks of the Execution Department that supervises compliance 
with the Court’s judgments. This means that the European Union’s contribution 
to the Council of Europe would have to be earmarked. For the time being, the 
Council of Europe does not favour earmarked contributions of this kind, only in 
circumstances where no other alternative would be possible. It also seems 
obvious to me that the EU’s contribution would be over and above the existing 
contributions by Member States. One sometimes hears disgruntled government 
officials complaining at the prospect of having to pay Strasbourg twice: directly 
as a party to the Convention, and indirectly as an EU Member State. 
Nonetheless, this seems to me entirely justified: a State would be creating work 
both as a party to the convention and as an EU Member State. It seems only 
fair that the accession of the new High Contracting Party would lead to an 
increase in the total budget, rather than a different allocation formula among 
the parties who contribute to the existing budget. 
The second side-effect is non-financial. The accession of the European Union 
will send the only possible right signal to Moscow. The Russian Federation has 
finally agreed to ratify Protocol 14, after a protracted delay and after 
considerable pressure was brought to bear by the EU and EU Member States. 
The Kremlin will be pleased to see that the EU too is finally submitting to this 
mechanism. 
All in all, my conclusion is that the European Union’s accession to the ECHR can 
only be described as the ultimate anniversary present for the ECHR. I would go 
so far as to say that its accession will actually safeguard the long-term future of 
the European Court of Human Rights (and the Council of Europe). And I would 
also venture to observe that it is unusual for a 60-year-old to be at the 
threshold of a second childhood, with new challenges and new lessons to be 
learnt. The only thing I would not venture to do is to predict when the second 
round of ratifications will conclude... 
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